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U.S. Military Use of Non-Lethal
Weapons: Reality vs Perceptions
Susan D. LeVine 1 & Joseph A. Rutigliano, Jr. 2
On 31 March 2003, U.S. warfighters manned a checkpoint
near Najaf, Iraq, mindful that a suicide bomber had just killed
four U.S. soldiers at another Iraqi checkpoint. When a van
failed to heed verbal warnings to stop, they used their only other
option. They fired on the van, killing seven women and children.
While these actions may have been lawful, these types of
situations present U.S. forces with horrific moral dilemmas.
U.S. forces require alternatives to simply shouting or shooting.
Non-lethal weapons fill gaps between verbal warnings and lethal
force. They have been urgently needed and used by U.S. forces
in Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Haiti. Non-lethal
weapons have saved civilian lives, as one battalion commander
in Iraq noted -- and also saved the lives of US warfighters. The
need for non-lethal weapons grows as warfare and disasters
increasingly occur in population centers, as well as, at sea, as
small boats become the asymmetric weapon of choice.

Since 1996, the U.S. Department of Defense has developed and
fielded non-lethal weapons. Non-lethal weapons are “developed and
used with the intent to minimize the probability of producing
fatalities, significant or permanent injuries.” This intent is supported
by an unequalled effort focused on explicit user needs and a thorough
understanding of the human effects of non-lethal weapons
1.
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Strategy at the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD), where
she serves as senior advisor to the Director, JNLWD, on matters related
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employment. DoD policy also states that non-lethal weapons, “are not
intended to, eliminate risk of those actions entirely,” meaning that
non-lethal weapons do not come with a 100% guarantee of no injury
or death. Additionally, non-lethal weapons undergo extensive legal
review to ensure compliance with U.S. domestic law and international
legal obligations, including the law of war.
Yet, despite their need, underlying good intentions and
lawfulness, and rigorous human effects analyses, non-lethal weapons –
and associated technologies that are used to make them -continue to
face objections and misperceptions, just like other transformative
innovations. The reality, though, is that US warfighters, who
repeatedly face life-and-death situations in a complex operating
environment, want and need non-lethal weapons.
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advantages, is difficult”
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EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 1 (2003).

240

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015)
U.S. Military Use of Non-Lethal Weapons

I. Introduction
On 31 March 2003, U.S. warfighters manned a checkpoint near
Najaf, Iraq, mindful that a suicide bomber had just killed four U.S.
soldiers at another Iraqi checkpoint. When a van failed to heed verbal
warnings to stop, they used their only other option. They fired on the
van, killing seven women and children. 4 Such incidents continued,
with US warfighters unable to tell if an advancing driver was a suicide
bomber, or an innocent civilian fleeing danger or unable to
understand the signs. But, checkpoint casualties eventually declined
with warfighters’ use of non-lethal systems, like dazzling lasers for
warning and vehicle stopping devices. 5
Non-lethal weapons fill gaps between verbal warnings and lethal
force. They are often urgently needed by U.S. forces, and since 1996,
the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Non-Lethal Weapons program
has helped meet those needs. 6 According to DoD policy, these nonlethal weapons are “developed and used with the intent to minimize
the probability of producing fatalities, significant or permanent
injuries,” while recognizing they, “are not intended to, eliminate risk
of those actions entirely.” 7 Moreover, non-lethal weapons are
developed and used in compliance with U.S. laws and treaties. 8 Yet,
despite their growing need, the good intentions behind their
development, and their lawfulness, non-lethal weapons continue to
face objections and misperceptions.
This article will address the growing operational necessity for nonlethal weapons, the specific intent behind their development, e.g., the
minimization of civilian casualties, and the legal review process to
which all non-lethal weapons are subject. Finally, this article will
address common misperceptions of the development and use of nonlethal weapons in the hope that these misperceptions may be
corrected and allow interested readers to understand that the intent
behind non-lethal weapons is to put more humane alternatives in the
4.

Athalie Matthews, Civilians Killed by US Forces Amid Suicide Fears,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 31, 2003), http:// www. theguardian. com/ world/
2003/apr/01/iraq.

5.

Greg Jaffe, U.S. Curbs Iraqi Civilian Deaths In Checkpoint, Convoy
Incidents, WALL ST. J. (June 6, 2006 12:01 AM), http:// online. wsj.
com/articles/SB114955863297172189.

6.

History, JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, http://
defense.gov/About/History.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).

7.

DoD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and NLW
Policy, DoD Directive 3000.03E (Apr. 25, 2013)

8.

Non-Lethal Weapons FAQs, JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM,
http://jnlwp.defense.gov/About/FrequentlyAskedQuestions/NonLethal
WeaponsFAQs.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
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hands of our warfighters rather than leaving them with the stark
choice between “shouting and shooting.”

II. Growing Operational Necessity
A. Somalia—the Prologue

DoD’s nonlethal weapons program grew out of the tactical needs
of the U.S. operations in Somalia, between 1992 and 1995. Here,
conflict and chaos occurred amongst the people—a change in the
operational experience for Cold War-equipped forces, and a harbinger
of things to come. With only verbal warnings and lethal force, U.S.
forces were unable to stop the people from throwing rocks and
Molotov cocktails, 9 openly looting military equipment, 10 and storming
food trucks. 11 Somalis knew U.S. forces only used lethal force for selfdefense.
But, when self-defense was warranted, U.S. forces often faced
horrific moral dilemmas. In the battle of Mogadishu, on 3–4 October
1993, Somali children walked down the street, pointing out U.S. Army
Rangers’ positions to a hidden shooter. 12 U.S. forces also faced a
Somali gunman completely covered by civilians; he lay prone between
two kneeling women and had four children sitting on him. 13 While
these civilians forfeited their protection against direct attack under
the law because of their willful actions, U.S. service members should
have more alternatives available than resorting to lethal force.
It is legal to engage civilians who are directly participating in
hostilities. 14 However, “[k]illing these women and children did not
9.

ROBERT F. BAUMANN & LAWRENCE A. YATES WITH VERSALLE F.
WASHINGTON, “MY CLAN AGAINST THE WORLD” US AND COALITION
FORCES IN SOMALIA 1992-1994, 83 (2003). (“On 24 February, shortly
after sunrise, Aideed’s followers began demonstrating at the US embassy
compound and at other locations within his sectors of Mogadishu. The
crowds threw rocks and Molotov cocktails, burned tires, and established
barricades at various locations.”).

10.

Id. at 208 (“[G]roups of Somalis, driven by poverty, might mob foreign
soldiers, making off with anything of value.”).

11.

Edward Liszka & Dennis B. Herbert, Non-Lethal Capabilities Are Now Viable
Option in a Fast Changing Landscape, NAT’L DEF., Dec. 1997, at 17–18 (“In
Somalia, Marines were confronted by hostile warlords using women and children
as shields. Hordes of Somalis stormed trucks loaded with food despite verbal
warnings and armed presence.”).

12.

BAUMANN ET AL., supra note 7, at 209 (“During the battle of 3-4
October, for example, Aideed’s militiamen used what was for them a
traditional tactic of employing women and children to shield gunmen
and to identify the position of US troops.”).

13.

MARK BOWDEN, BLACKHAWK DOWN 42–43, 46 (1999).

14.

PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POL’Y & CONFLICT RES., IHL
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES IN THE OPT 3 (2007).
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come easily to American soldiers, but in the effort to stay alive, kill
them they did, and at close range,” wrote Robert F. Baumann,
Lawrence A. Yates, and Versalle F. Washington in the Army study,
“My Clan Against the World”—US and Coalition Forces in Somalia
1992-1994.15
In preparing for the 1995 U.N. withdrawal from Somalia, U.S.
Marines adopted non-lethal weapons. Marines saw them as helping
minimize civilian casualties, while countering looters and rioters, who
sought credit for “driving the Americans back into the sea.” 16 Marine
reservists, who used them in law enforcement, trained Marines to use

oleoresin capsicum “pepper” spray; non-lethal shotgun rounds;
non-lethal grenades projecting small rubber balls; road spikes or

“caltrops”; and other devices. They were seen as force options, in
addition to lethal force, but were not intended to replace the use of
lethal force. 17
These non-lethal weapons deterred hostile crowds. While they had
limited use in the withdrawal, Marines communicated their
capabilities to the Somali population in advance. The U.N. withdrew
from Somalia smoothly and without casualties. 18 Afterwards, task
force commander, Lieutenant Gen. Anthony Zinni, USMC, reported,
“Our experience in Somalia with non-lethal weapons offered ample
testimony to the tremendous flexibility they offer to warriors on the
field of battle.” 19
Despite being well received by many users, non-lethal weapons
were misperceived by others. Varying critics saw them as unworkable,

15.

See BAUMANN

ET AL.,

supra note 7, at 209.

16.

Stanton Coerr, For Those in Harm’s Way, PROCEEDINGS, April 2002, at
42–43.

17.

NICK LEWER & STEPHEN SCHOFIELD, NONLETHAL WEAPONS: A FATAL
ATTRACTION? 68–69 (1997).

18.

See Lt. Col. James C. Duncan, A Primer on the Emplyoment of NonLethal Weapons, 45 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 3 (1998).

19.

RICHARD L. SCOTT, CONFLICT WITHOUT CASUALTIES: NONLETHAL WEAPONS
IN IRREGULAR WARFARE 6–7 (2007) (“In 1995, Lt. Gen. Anthony Zinni
anticipated the need to fill the void between verbal warnings and lethal
force for unarmed hostiles while extracting United Nations (UN)
peacekeepers from Somalia. His plan involved the withdrawal of over 6000
coalition troops. He used intelligence operations to ensure the local
population was informed that his forces were armed and ready with nonlethal grenade launchers and shotguns that fired pepper sprays, stinger
grenades, flash bangs, and sticky foam, as well as caltrops to supplement
various barriers at night. In the end, not a single shot was fired and all
troops and equipment were withdrawn without suffering a Task Force
casualty.”).
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unethical, and eroding the warrior ethos 20—the first of many
misperceptions that were to follow.
But, the strongest supporters were warriors who knew war’s moral
dilemmas, particularly when lethal force was the only option.
Referring to non-lethal weapons, then-Commandant of the Marine
Corps, Gen. Charles Krulak, wrote in 1995, “[t]heir use better enables
us to respond proportionately and with greater flexibility to the wide
range of threats we can expect to face today and in the future.” 21
More emphatic was Gen. John J. Sheehan, USMC, then-Supreme
Allied Commander Atlantic and Commander, U.S. Atlantic
Command: “This nation should no longer tolerate dedicated,
professional troops equipped with the wrong tools for new, more
complex missions….Non-lethal weapons must be part of today’s tool
kit.” 22
B. You Can’t Kill Your Way to Victory—The Need for Non-Lethals
Expands

In 1996, the Non-Lethal Weapons Program was established, with
Gen. Krulak readily accepting executive agent responsibilities. DoD
issued policy noting that non-lethal weapons, “should enhance the
capability of U.S. Forces to…take military action in situations where
use of lethal force is not the preferred option.” Additionally, the
policy stated that “The availability of non-lethal weapons shall not
limit a commander’s inherent authority and obligation to use all
necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in selfdefense.” 23
It was fortuitous. In the world ahead, U.S. forces’ need for nonlethal weapons would increase significantly and their use would
expand in scope as illustrated below:
•Sevce, Kosovo: A small number of U.S. forces fired non-lethal
munitions, sponge grenades and stinger rounds, to stop a much
larger, rock-throwing crowd. 24
•Al Kut, Iraq: In a city of 300,000, a Marine infantry battalion
used non-lethal weapons almost daily to control crowds, often
angry due to late fuel trucks. Eventually, just the breakout of
20.

NICK LEWER & STEPHEN SCHOFIELD, NONLETHAL WEAPONS: A FATAL
ATTRACTION? 69–71 (1997).

21.

Id. at 71.

22.

LT. COL. ERIK L. NUTLEY, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: SETTING OUR
PHASERS ON STUN? POTENTIAL STRATEGIC BLESSINGS AND COURSES OF
NON-LETHAL WEAPONS ON THE BATTLEFIELD 8 (2003).

23.

Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons, DoD Directive 3000.3 (Jul. 9, 1996).

24.

Eric Adams, Shoot to Not Kill, POPULAR SCIENCE, May 2003, at 90.
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the OC, or pepper spray cylinder, caused crowds to disperse.
“Many Iraqi lives were saved as a direct result of 2/8 [2d
Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment] employment of NLW,” stated
the battalion commander, Col. Royal Mortenson. 25
•Afghanistan: U.S. forces use dazzling lasers to deter rock
throwing locals from damaging vehicles or injuring troops;
military convoys used non-lethal lasers to alert civilian vehicles
and prevent collisions and hazards, thus saving lives (See
YouTube’s Non-lethal GLARE laser dazzler in Afghanistan). 26
•Haiti: At a checkpoint, U.S. forces used a vehicle-stopping net
with spikes to stop a fleeing car. This vehicle stopping net also
was used in Iraq and Afghanistan. 27
•Guantanamo, Cuba: U.S. forces used OC, or pepper spray, to
control a detainee disturbance in 2006, as well as, non-lethal
munitions, to disperse a rock-throwing crowd in 2013. 28

In 2011, then-Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen.
Joseph Dunford, stated, the “demand for non-lethal weapons exceeds
the inventory.” 29 They had become critical in the counterinsurgency
campaign in Afghanistan. “Counterinsurgents cannot succeed if they
harm the people they are striving to protect,” stated International
Security Assistance Force Commander General David Petraeus, who
directed subordinates to identify their top ten non-lethal weapons. 30
25.

See Interview with Col. Royal Mortenson, U.S. Marine Corps, in
Quantico, Va. (Aug. 17, 2005) (on file with author).

26.

Rotifers, Non-Lethal GLARE Laser Dazzler in Afghanistan, YOUTUBE
(Apr. 2, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mD_ciCZJ7q0.

27.

Police, Camera, Zapper: A futuristic gadget which disables suspect
vehicles with radio waves could soon be used by police in car chases. It’s
their latest weapon in safely ending pursuit, BBC NEWS (Jul. 14, 2004),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/3890127.stm.

28.

Michael Isikoff, ‘Non-lethal Round’ Fired at Gitmo Detainees in Soccer
Field Incident, US military Confirms, NBC NEWS (Mar. 7, 2013),
http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/07/17228617-nonlethal-round-fired-at-gitmo-detainees-in-soccer-field-incident-us-militaryconfirms.

29.

James K. Sanborn, Dunford: Marines Will Continue to Be Needed,
CORPS
TIMES
(Apr.
14,
2011),
http://
www.
MARINE
marinecorpstimes.com/article/20110414/NEWS/104140324/DunfordMarines-will-continue-needed.

30.

Heather Maher, U.S. General Cites ‘Significant’ Progress In Afghanistan,
But Calls Gains ‘Fragile’, RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO LIBERTY (Oct. 25, 2014),
http:// www. rferl.org/ content/ petraeus_fragile_success_afghanistan/
2339325.html; Sjef Orbons, Are Non‐Lethal Weapons a Viable Military
Option to Strengthen the Hearts and Minds Approach in Afghanistan?, 28
DEF. & SEC. ANALYSIS 114, 115 (2008) (“There is a need, therefore, for
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U.S. forces are not the only ones that seek to minimize casualties
in operations. Coalition partners and allies seek to do the same.
Increasingly, US forces have helped build non-lethal capabilities with
the forces of such partner nations as Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Croatia, Mongolia, Philippines, Romania, and more. 31
C. Future—The Needs Grow

In the aftermath of the 2010 Haiti earthquake, non-lethal weapons
were used when riots occurred at food distribution sites. 32 They are
essential in dealing with a populace that becomes desperate after
natural disasters, which occur five times as often as they did in the
1970s, according to a 2014 UN report, and predicted to increase in
frequency and severity. 33
War among the people—irregular warfare—continues, with
disturbing trends, demanding non-lethal weapons. U.S. forces have
adequate training and the means to stop a vehicle, without having to open
fire. Petraeus called for novel and effective ways to neutralise such a threat
without having to use lethal force. In doing so, he also encouraged the use
of non-lethal weapons (NLWs) and asked US force planners to identify their
top 10 NLWs.”).
31.

See, Cpl. Erik Estrada, NOLES 2014 Comes to a Close, DEF. VIDEO &
IMAGERY DISTRIBUTION SYS. (Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.dvidshub.net/
news/139768/noles-2014-comes-close#.VExDY_nF-Sq; Donna Miles,
Marines Lead Multinational Nonlethal Weapons Training, DEP’T DEF.
NEWS
(Aug.
27,
2013),
http://www.defense.gov/
news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=120680; Charlie Coon, Troops Learn Nonlethal
Crowd Control Techniques, STARS & STRIPES (Jun. 16, 2006),
http://www.stripes.com/news/troops-learn-nonlethal-crowd-controltechniques-1.50400.

32.

Lt. Col. John N. Ohlweiler, Building the Airplane While in Flight:
International and Military Law Challenges in Operation Unified
Response, ARMY LAW., Jan. 2011 at 17,18, 20; Services Hold Integrated
Concept Team Meetings, JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM
NEWSLETTER (Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, Quantico, VA),
Nov. 2010, at 7 (“The U.S. Army Integrated Concept Team met June
29-30 in St. Charles, Mo. Attendees received updates from the
Sustainment Center of Excellence, which included a discussion of the
non-lethal weapons that were successfully used during Haiti relief
operations, as well as briefs on various non-lethal weapons programs and
efforts”).

33.

See, e.g., Suzanne Goldenberg, Eight Ways Climate Change is Making
14,
2014),
the
World
More
Dangerous,
GUARDIAN (Jul.
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2014/jul/14/8-chartsclimate-change-world-more-dangerous?commentpage=2; To the Brink:
Climate Change Will Increase Frequency and Severity of Disasters,
Stress Food and Energy Productions in South Asia, WORLD BANK (Jul.
24, 2013), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/06/24/
climate-change-natural-disasters-stress-food-energy-production-southasia.
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faced human shields used by enemies in the World War II battle of
Okinawa, 34 Vietnam, Beirut, 35 Afghanistan, and Iraq. In these
instances innocent men, women, and children were killed—and U.S.
veterans lived with their ghosts, some suffering Post Traumatic
Stress. 36
Amnon Rubinstein and Yaniv Roznei recently wrote that “[t]he
use of human shields has dramatically escalated.” 37 Reportedly,

human shields have been used in Libya, 38 Syria, 39 Ukraine,40
Yemen, 41 and elsewhere. “…human shields during hostilities has

become one of the major problems facing democracies in
contemporary armed conflicts.” 42
Notably, the use of human shields escalated as media coverage
and the media cycle increased. In World War II, nine reporters were
with Marines at the 1943 Tarawa assault. 43 In the July-August 2014
34.

LAURA HOMAN LACEY, STAY OFF
DIVISION ON OKINAWA 67-68 (2005).

35.

Maj. Robert T. Jordan (USMC (Ret.)), Letter to the Editor, MARINE
CORPS GAZ., Feb. 2008, at 6–7.

36.

Charlotte Tucker, U.S. Veterans Struggle with Pain, Stigma of PostTraumatic Stress: New Research Aimed at Mental Health, NATION’S
HEALTH (Apr. 2012), http://thenationshealth.aphapublications.org/content/
42/3/1.1.full (“Iraq in 2003 was a nightmare C.J. Grisham could not wake
up from. It was sustained, almost daily combat for months, and Grisham, a
first sergeant in the Army, said he could feel the strain. Once, he said he
was forced to shoot a person being used as a human shield.”).

37.

Amnon Rubinstein & Yaniv Roznai, Symposium: Defense Policy:
Human Shields in Modern Armed Conflicts: The Need for a
Proportionate Proportionality, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 94 (2011).

38.

Chris Stephen, Gaddafi Forces Using Human Shields, Libya Rebels Claim,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 28, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/
aug/28/gaddafi-forces-human-shields-libya.

39.

U.N. Accuses Syria of Using Children as Human Shields, CBS NEWS
(Jun. 12, 2012, 9:28 AM) http://www.cbsnews.com/news/un-accusessyria-of-using-children-as-human-shields-kofi-annan-urges-nations-totwist-arms/.

40.

See Civilians in Slovyansk, Ukraine, Allegedly Used as Human Shields,
NBC NEWS (May 5, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukrainecrisis/civilians-slovyansk-ukraine-allegedly-used-human-shields-n97156.

41.

Yemen Government: Rebels Use Civilians as Human Shields, CNN (Oct.
13, 2009, 7:30 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/10/13/
yemen.human.shields/index.html?_s=PM:WORLD.

42.

Rubinstein & Roznai, supra note 35, at 94.

43.

SEAN J.A. EDWARDS, MARS UNMASKED: THE CHANGING FACE OF URBAN
OPERATIONS
40
n.5
(2000),
http://www.rand.org/
pubs/
monograph_reports/MR1173.html (“Charles Rick notes that only nine
civilian war correspondents were present on the island of Tarlac in the
South Pacific in 1943…”).
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conflict in Gaza, nearly 600 media units were in Israel and Palestine. 44
Moreover, social media rapidly transmits globally. In such
environments, warring groups seek to exploit civilian casualties to
build support for their side and opposition against the other. These
groups hide among the civilian population putting the entire
population at risk. While those civilians who voluntarily act as human
shields may be considered to be directly participating in the hostilities
thereby losing their protection against direct attack, the use of
involuntary human shields creates quite the quandary for the
warfighter. 45
A solution was advocated by Maj. Robert T. Jordan, USMC(Ret),
recounting his Vietnam and Beirut experiences in the Marine Corps
Gazette:
“…impacting rockets drove the NVA (North Vietnamese Army)
toward our position north of the Vu Gia River. Masking their
movement were scores of civilians being driven in front of them.
As the crowd neared our column along the river, artillery
impacted to their rear, and our machine gunners launched
bursts of fire over the civilians’ heads, hoping to impact among
the NVA. Panicking civilians scattered, but some fell as the
NVA opened up on their rear. Others ran into our machine gun
fire…We made no friends that day. How different it might have
been if we had non-lethal alternatives. I witnessed scores of
similar incidents in Vietnam and later in Beirut where our
options were either deadly force or to disengage. It is time that
our military planners, logisticians, and tactical commanders add
non-lethal alternatives to our war chests.” 46

The need for non-lethal weapons is not restricted to engagements
on land; the need for non-lethal weapons is also increasing for the
maritime environment. Small boats are the asymmetric weapon of
choice, indistinguishable in heavily trafficked littorals. They
previously have been used for:

44.

Nati Tucker, Gaza War Proves Big Draw to World Media, HAARETZ
(Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israelgaza-conflict-2014/.premium-1.609064 (“[c]lose to 600 foreign journalists
covering Gaza conflict, two thirds of which don’t report from the Israeli
side, says director of Israel’s Government Press Office.”).

45.

See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields In International
Humanitarian Law, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 292 (2009) (discussing
different theories of voluntary and involuntary human shields and the
issue it presents to humanitarian law).

46.

See Jordan, supra note 33.
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•Suicide bombings against ships, like the USS Cole in 2000 and
French Limburg tanker in 2002 47
•Bombings/attacks against infrastructure, as done by fishing
dhows on Iraqi oil terminals in 2004 48
•Terrorist landings as occurred in the 2008 Mumbai attack 49
•Pirating larger vessels, like the MV Maersk Alabama in 2009 50

In ambiguous situations, the intent of unknown small boat
operators may be determined with the aid of non-lethal capabilities,
ranging from long range acoustic devices that provide a means to
transmit hailing and warning messages to “flash bang” munitions that
provide visual effects. Such non-lethal capabilities can help determine
whether the apparent threatening actions of small boat operators are
actually intended to cause harm, or are being done for completely
other reasons, and thereby prevent a situation from developing into
one where lethal force is used.
Presently, U.S. vessels use acoustic hailers and dazzling lasers to
warn and instruct approaching small boats. In the future, these
capabilities could be augmented with systems that project heatproducing, millimeter wave energy to repel small boat operators
posing a threat to U.S. forces as was demonstrated in 2013.51
These and other non-lethal capabilities could aid protection of
shore-based facilities and infrastructure. Notably, unmanned surface
vessels, equipped with acoustic hailers, dazzling lasers, and flash-bang

47.

Raphael Perl & Ronald O’Rourke, Terrorist Attack on USS Cole:
Background and Issues for Congress, NAVY DEP’T LIB. (Jan. 30, 2001),
http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/usscole_crsreport.htm/;
Yemen Says Tanker Blast Was Terrorism, BBC NEWS (Oct. 16, 2002),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2334865.stm.

48.

Two Sailors Killed in Arabian Gulf Oil Terminal Attacks, NAVY NEWS
SERV. (Apr. 24, 2004, 6:21 PM), http://www.navy.mil/submit/
display.asp?story_id=12977.

49.

Joseph Teneglia, TDC Security Alert: Maritime Aspects of Mumbai
Terrorist Attacks, MAR. EXEC. (Dec. 4, 2008), http://www.maritimeexecutive.com/article/tdc-security-alert-maritime-aspects-mumbaiterror-attacks.

50.

Mark Mazzetti & Sharon Otterman, U.S. Captain Is Hostage of Pirates;
Navy Ship Arrives, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2009), http:// www.
nytimes.com/2009/04/09/world/africa/09pirates.html.

51.

Staff Sgt. Wesley Farnsworth, Fort Eustis Participates in Non-Lethal
Operational Demonstration, U.S. MARINE CORPS NEWS (Sept. 17, 2013),
http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/News/NewsArticleDisplay/tabid/3488/Articl
e/150140/fort-eustis-participates-in-non-lethal-maritime-operationaldemonstration.aspx.
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munitions, could operate forward and respond to intruder vessels.
This capability was demonstrated in 2012. 52
There is also growing need to non-lethally stop, search, and seize
suspect vessels. Today, U.S. Coast Guard vessels use non-lethal
ammunition, as well as, propeller-entangling nets to stop high-speed
vessels. 53 Navy boarding teams use non-lethal and lethal weapons
when searching suspect vessels. 54 In the future, non-lethal capabilities
will be needed to stop large, displacement hull vessels, suspected of
illicit trafficking -- humans, drugs, and/or weapons -- as well as
carrying weapons of mass destruction.

III. Intent—and Unequalled Effort
DoD’s non-lethal weapons are intended “to prevent the target
from functioning” and “have relatively reversible effects on personnel
or materiel,” while also recognizing that the risk of fatalities and
injuries cannot be eliminated entirely. 55 DoD’s intent also is reflected
in unequaled efforts to maximize the effectiveness of non-lethal
weapons while minimizing their risk of significant injury or death.
Central to these efforts are human effects studies, analysis, and
independent reviews 56 and related efforts such as those in the
following areas.
A. Determining the “Goalposts” for Effectiveness—Explicit User Needs

Non-lethal weapons “are explicitly designed and primarily
employed to incapacitate targeted personnel or materiel
immediately.” 57 “Explicit design” is based on explicit user needs,
defined by the tasks that users need to conduct the mission. For
example, users may need a capability to non-lethally counter
personnel, which could involve such tasks as denying access; moving
or disabling personnel; or suppressing performance. Specific conditions

52.

Navy Equips Unmanned Boats with Non-Lethal Weapons for Fleet
NEWS
SERV.
(Feb.
3,
2012),
Experiment,
NAVY
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=65164.

53.

U.S. COAST GUARD, A HISTORY OF COAST GUARD AVIATION 14 (2008)
https://www.uscg.mil/history/webaircraft/CGAviationHistory1994_200
8.pdf.

54.

NAVY NEWS SERV., supra note 50.

55.

DoD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and NLW
Policy, DoD Directive 3000.03E (Apr. 25, 2013).

56.

Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) Human Effects Characterization, DoD
Directive 3200.19 (May 17, 2012).

57.

Id.
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and standards are also defined, for example, the range and duration of
effects required. 58
Explicit needs are assessed against existing and emerging
technologies and their human effects, and then evaluated for their
potential to meet them. For example, the improved flash bang
grenade may rate high for suppressing a specified behavior, while a
blunt impact, shotgun round may have only medium potential.
B. Characterizing Human Effects—How Close They Get to the Goalposts

This characterization is needed to determine if a non-lethal
weapon is likely to work as intended, both in terms of effectiveness
and minimizing the risk of significant injury. Thus, human effects are
characterized in non-lethal weapons development, as mandated by
DoD policy.
Non-lethal weapons development progressively characterizes
human effects, achieving prescribed “human effectiveness readiness
levels.” 59 Generally, this progressive characterization occurs as
outlined below:
•Cause-and-effect observed and postulated: These achieve
human effects readiness levels 0-2. An example is the discovery
and investigation of human effects associated with the Active
Denial System, which repels individuals. In 1988, Air Force
Research Lab personnel observed 94 GHz millimeter wave
energy causing aversive responses. They postulated that the
energy penetrated and heated skin, and stimulated nerve
endings. 60
•Cause-and-effect confirmed; small animal models determined
when effects do and do not occur; and risk of injury and
effectiveness postulated for human population segments: These
achieve human effects readiness levels 3-4. For example, in the
1990s, researchers found that rats avoided 94 GHz millimeter
wave energy, and confirmed that energy was deposited in skin,
rapidly heating and stimulating nerve endings. Researchers
believed that by limiting exposures, thermal injuries could be
avoided in humans. 61

58.

See generally SUSAN LEVINE, THE ACTIVE DENIAL
REVOLUTIONARY, NON-LETHAL WEAPON FOR TODAY’S
(2009), http:// www.dtic.mil/ dtic/ tr/fulltext/ u2/
(advocating for further use of NLW in situations that
whether or not they be combat situations).

59.

See DoD Directive 3200.19, supra note 54.

60.

LEVINE, supra note 56, at 6.

61.

Id.
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•Effects gradually assessed in humans or surrogates in lab and
field: Achieves human effects readiness levels 5-7. In developing
the Active Denial System in the late 1990s, volunteers were
exposed to small spots of millimeter wave energy on their backs,
in a lab, leading to larger exposures, under controlled
conditions. In 2001, an Active Denial System prototype made
back and frontal exposures on static volunteers at intended field
ranges, repelling over 95 percent. In 2003, exposures were made
on moving personnel in the field, repelling as well. 62
•Human or surrogate participation in realistic field or
operational testing. This achieves human effects readiness levels
8-9. Since 2005, the Active Denial System has repelled volunteer
personnel in field, urban, and maritime environments, totaling
over 12,000 exposures. 63
C. Incorporating Human Effects Research into Systems Design

Characterizing a non-lethal weapon’s human effects includes
determining possible injuries, conditions of occurrence, and risk of
injury margins. For example, research determined that Active Denial
System exposures, longer than prescribed times, would cause thermal
injuries, and specified those times, so they could be avoided. That
information was incorporated into the system’s design so that
appropriate controls would minimize risk of overexposure. For the
long range, large spot size capability developed under an Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstration program, 64 the Active Denial
System’s risk of significant injury was determined to be 0.009-0.1
percent.
D. Conducting Independent Reviews

DoD guidance requires that non-lethal weapons human effects
analysis be independently reviewed by a Human Effects Review Board
“comprised of the DoD Health Effects Officer; members representing
the Surgeon Generals of each Service (including the Medical Officer of
the U.S. Marine Corps); and U.S. Special Operations Command, as
applicable; and a safety representative from each Service and US
Special Operations Command.” 65

62.

JOHN M. KENNY ET AL., A NARRATIVE SUMMARY AND INDEPENDENT
ASSESSMENT OF THE ACTIVE DENIAL SYSTEM 21–22 (2008),
http://jnlwp.defense.gov/Portals/50/Documents/Future_NonLethal_Weapons/HEAP.pdf.

63.

LEVINE, supra note 56, at 6–7.

64.

Id. at 3.

65.

DoD Directive 3200.19, supra note 54.
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IV. Legal and Non-Lethal
During Operation United Shield in Somalia, it was reported that
as an armed mob of Somalis approached a U.S. Marine position, a
Marine aimed a low-powered Saber 203 laser 66 at an individual in the
center of the mob. Upon being “lit up” by the bright red light, the
rest of the mob took notice and fled the area, leaving the man
standing alone. 67
Subsequent to this incident, a nongovernmental organization
claimed such lasers could blind, “were unnecessarily cruel...repugnant
to the public conscience,” and should be banned. 68 This call supported
the two-decade long effort by Sweden and the International
Committee of the Red Cross to obtain a ban on blinding lasers. This
effort culminated in the adoption by the States Parties to the
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 69 of a blinding laser
protocol in 1995. 70 The blinding laser protocol arguably banned a nonexistent weapon, 71 and would not have banned the Saber 203 laser
used by the Marine in Somali. Notwithstanding, after dazzling lasers
were deployed at checkpoints in Iraq and Afghanistan, other
organizations claimed they too violated international law. 72
66.

U.S. AIR FORCE, FACT SHEET, PERSONNEL HALTING AND SIMULATION
RESPONSE
(PHASR)
(Apr.
2006),
http://www.kirtland.af.mil/
shared/media/document/AFD-070404-043.pdf (“Lightweight, simple to
operate, and easy to handle, Saber 203 could also be used as a laser
designator. It could counter night vision devices. The system was used
successfully in 1995 by U.S. Marines in Somalia during Operation
United Shield.”).

67.

JAMES ADAMS, THE NEXT WORLD WAR: COMPUTERS
AND THE FRONT LINE IS EVERYWHERE 142 (1998)

68.

See HUM. RTS. WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ARMS PROJECT: U.S.
BLINDING LASER WEAPONS REPORT (1995), http://www.hrw.org/
reports/1995/Us2.htm.

69.

United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of
Certain Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, opened for signature April
10, 1981, 1342 U.NT.S. 137 [hereinafter CCW Convention].

70.

Protocol to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of
Certain Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects of Oct. 10, 1980, adopted
Oct. 13, 1995, T.I.A.S. No. 09-721.2 [hereinafter CCW Convention
Protocol IV].

71.

W. Hays Parks, Conventional Weapons and Weapons Reviews, 8 Y.B.
INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 55, 85 (2005).

72.

Military Under Fire for Planned Laser Purchase, OTTAWA CITIZEN (Jul.
11, 2008), http:// www.canada.com/ topics/news/ national/
story.html?id=677f248c-7329-4a9e-bb40-3117dda52169.
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Despite these claims of illegality, the use of dazzling lasers, as well
as all DoD’s non-lethal weapons, is lawful. This is ensured by an
extensive legal review process that is required by DoD regulation,73
and implementation by each Military Department. 74
These regulations require that all weapons, weapon systems, and
ammunition undergo a legal review before procurement to ensure
compliance with U.S. domestic law and our international legal
obligations, including the law of war. 75 Program managers overseeing
the development and procurement of all potential weapons or weapon
systems are required to ensure that a legal review is conducted of such
item before the award of the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development contract and again before the award of the initial
production contract. No weapon or weapon system may be acquired
or fielded without this legal review. 76 The request for a legal review
should include a description of the intended use of the weapon
system, weapon specifications, and the results of any tests on the
wounding effect, such as human effects testing. 77
The legal review must address three specific areas: whether the
weapon or weapon system causes unnecessary suffering; whether the
weapon or weapon system is discriminate in its effect; and whether a
specific rule of law or treaty prohibits or otherwise restricts the use of
the weapon or weapon system. 78 It is strongly recommended that in
the early stages of development or procurement, potential weapons
undergo a preliminary legal review to ensure its intended use is
consistent with domestic and international law. Such reviews are
73.

The Defense Acquisition System, DoD Directive 5000.01 (May 12, 2003).

74.

See U.S. Army, Reg. 27-53, Review of Legality of Weapons Under
International Law (1 Jan. 1979) [hereinafter AR 27-53]; U.S. Air Force,
Instr. 51-402, Legal Reviews of Weapons and Cyber Capabilities (27
July 2011) [hereinafter AFI 51-402]; U.S. Navy, Sec’y of the Navy Instr.
5000.2E, Department of the Navy Implementation and Operation of the
Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (1 Sept. 2011).

75.

The “law of war” is defined as, “That part of international law that
regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It is often called the ‘law of
armed conflict.’ The law of war encompasses all international law for
the conduct of hostilities binding on the United States or its individual
citizens, including treaties and international agreements to which the
United States is a party, and applicable customary international law.”
See DoD Law of War Program, DoD Directive 2311.01E (Feb. 22,
2011).

76.

Department of the Navy Implementation and Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System, SecNav Instruction 5000.2E 1 (Sept. 1, 2011).

77.

Id.

78.

Id.
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intended to identify issues early, thus preventing costly remedies
later.
Specific DoD policy on non-lethal weapons also requires non-lethal
weapons to undergo the same legal review process. 79 Moreover, DoD
policy notes the importance of the human effects testing in legal
reviews, directing that “human effects assessment data is provided to
the servicing legal office to support the legal review of non-lethal
weapons required during the acquisition process.” 80
In addition to human effects testing, legal reviews take into
account a non-lethal weapon’s technical functioning, operating
parameters, and intended use. It is also understood that the term
“non-lethal” is referring to the users’ intention, and that non-lethal
weapons are not expected to have a zero probability of fatalities or
permanent injuries. 81
Additionally, legal reviews consider the differences between lethal
and non-lethal weapons. Lethal weapons may lawfully destroy targets
through blast, penetration, or fragmentation, or may kill or seriously
injure enemy combatants or other persons posing a threat or potential
threat to life or limb of U.S. forces. On the other hand, non-lethal
weapons employ means other than gross physical destruction to
prevent the target from functioning. Non-lethal weapons are intended
to have relatively reversible effects on personnel or materiel. 82 Nonlethal weapons are to be employed to, among other things, deter,
discourage, delay, or prevent hostile actions; de-escalate situations to
preclude lethal force; 83 and to reinforce deterrence and expand the
range of options available to commanders. 84 As with lethal weapons,
non-lethal weapons undergo the same analysis in the legal review
process. 85

79.

DoD Directive 3000.03E, supra note 53.

80.

DoD Directive 3200.19, supra note 54.

81.

DoD Directive 3000.3E, supra note 53.

82.

Id.

83.

Id.

84.

Id.

85.

SecNav Instruction 5000.2E, supra note 74 (defining “weapons” and
“weapon systems” to include non-lethal weapons).
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A. Unnecessary Suffering

Relevant treaty law for this principle is contained in the Hague
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
of 18 October 1907, in particular, Article 23(e) of its Annexed
Regulations. 86 Article 23(e) prohibits the employment of “arms,
projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.” 87
This prohibition against unnecessary suffering acknowledges that
suffering to combatants is both lawful and expected, and may even
include severe injury or death. While there is no accepted definition of
the term, “unnecessary suffering,” the appropriate determination is
whether the weapon’s employment in its normal expected use
inevitably would cause injury, including death, that is manifestly
disproportionate to the weapons stated purpose and the expected
military advantage to be gained by the use. 88
“This balancing test cannot be conducted in isolation”“ write US
Army lawyers Richard B. Jackson and Jason Ray Hutchison in their
article, Lasers Are Lawful as Non-Lethal Weapons. 89 “A weapon or
munition’s effects must be weighed in light of comparable, lawful
weapons or munitions in use on the modern battlefield.” 90
In weighing the need for stopping most vehicles at Iraqi and
Afghan checkpoints, glare-producing lasers were seen as having more
proportionate effects than lethal force, as indicated by U.S. Army Lt.
Gen. Pete Chiarelli in a 19 May 2006, DoD news briefing:
[W]hen you consider the alternative, which is a bullet, I
honestly believe we can use [lasers]; we can use them effectively.
We can use them in ways that don’t necessarily even, quote,
unquote, “light up” the individual, but provide a marker so
individuals realize that they are approaching a danger point.
And we will do everything possible to inform the Iraqi people of
their use, so when they see them, they react appropriately. 91

86.

Hague Convention (IV), Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 187 CTS 227, 1 Bevans 631 (hereinafter, for the
Convention, “Hague IV,” for the Regulations, “Hague IV Regs”).

87.

Id., at art. 23(e).

88.

Parks, supra note 69, at 140.

89.

Richard B. Jackson & Jason Ray Hutchison, Lasers Are Lawful as NonLethal Weapons, ARMY LAW., Aug. 2006, at 17.

90.

Id.

91.

Id. at 12; DoD News Briefing with Lt. Gen. Chiarelli from Iraq, U.S.
DEF. DEP’T (May 19, 2006), http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/
Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=252.
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By definition, most non-lethal weapons have no problem passing
this part of the legal review test.
B. Discrimination

A fundamental principle of the law of war is that combatants and
military objectives must be distinguished from noncombatants,
civilians, and civilian objects. Only combatants and military
objectives can be legitimately targeted. 92 Indiscriminate or “blind”
weapons are prohibited. Indiscriminate weapons are those that are as
likely to hit innocent civilians and civilian objects, as well as, lawful
military objectives. 93 “If a weapon cannot be controlled in such a
manner that it is capable of being directed against a lawful target,
then it fails the discriminate effects test,” wrote Jackson and
Hutchison. 94 In the case of dazzling lasers at checkpoints, Jackson and
Hutchison also wrote,
[U]se of the weapons facilitates discrimination of targets and
prevention of unnecessary civilian casualties. Determining the
potential threat of oncoming vehicles has proven extremely
difficult, and current methods of arm waving and flare firing to
warn approaching vehicle drivers have had limited success. The
... laser “dazzlers” will provide Soldiers the ability to
communicate a visual signal to approaching vehicle driver’s to
stay back while concurrently assisting in the Soldier’s
determination of the driver’s intent. 95

Moreover, dazzling lasers are extremely discriminate in that they
are “point-of-aim, point-of-impact” systems.
C. Specific Law or Treaty Prohibiting Use

All laws and treaties are reviewed for their applicability to nonlethal weapons. In the case of dazzling lasers, the relevant treaty is
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Protocol IV
on Blinding Laser Weapons. Article 1 of Protocol IV, states, “[i]t is
prohibited to employ laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole
combat function or as one of their combat functions, to cause
92.

Civilians who take a direct part in hostilities, or civilian objects used for
a military purpose, may also be targeted. See Yoram Dinstein,
Distinction and Loss of Civilian Protection in International Armed
Conflicts, 84 INT’L LAW STUDS. 183 (2008).

93.

See Parks, supra note 69, at 129; see also Hague IV Regs., supra note
84, at arts. 25-27; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
75 U.N.T.S. 287.

94.

Jackson & Hutchinson, supra note 87, at 17.

95.

Id. at 18.
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permanent blindness to unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or
to the eye with corrective eyesight devices.” 96
Dazzling lasers are excluded from this definition because they
cause at best, temporary blinding or a dazzling affect. They do not
cause permanent blindness when used appropriately. According to
Jackson and Hutchison, “None of the discussed laser systems were
‘specifically designed’ to cause permanent blindness, nor will standard
circumstances of use inflict such injuries.” 97 Therefore, Protocol IV
does not prohibit or restrict in any way the use of dazzling lasers for
anti-personnel purposes.
This determination was supported by human effects testing and
the intended uses of the dazzling lasers. Human effects were
quantified in research and testing, 98 conducted by DoD laboratories.
This included determining the conditions when these lasers were safe,
and when they injured. The results informed the development of
tactics and procedures for dazzling laser use at checkpoints, thus
helping avoid eye injuries. 99
Once a legal review determines the legality of a non-lethal
weapon, the weapon is then ready to be procured and fielded. It is
important to note that the legal review does not address law of war
issues related to targeting. These issues must be addressed at the time
of employment, to be determined by the on-scene commander under
the circumstances ruling at the time. Such issues are not
determinative of the lawfulness of the weapon. The commander
authorizing a weapon’s use must consider its characteristics, where
civilians are present, in order to ensure consistency with mission rules
of engagement and law of war proscriptions on directing attacks at
civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities or who otherwise do not
pose a threat to U.S. forces. 100

96.

CCW Convention Protocol IV, supra note 68, art. 1.

97.

Jackson & Hutchinson, supra note 87, at 18.

98.

Id. at 15–16.

99.

Id.

100. See Parks, supra note 69, at 141, n. 273; see also id. at 17.
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V. Misperceptions and Resistance—Common to Many
Innovations
“If you got an innovative idea, and the majority does not poohpooh it, then the odds are you must not have a very good idea,” said
CNN founder Ted Turner. 101 Many innovations go against
conventional wisdom and existing order; non-lethal weapons are no
exception. Despite demonstrated operational need, documented intent
to minimize fatalities, unequalled effort to characterize human effects
and risk of significant injury, and compliance with all applicable laws
and treaties, DoD’s non-lethal weapons often face misperceptions as
illustrated below:
•The moniker “non-lethal” means zero percent chance of injury
or death: Defense Department policy explicitly states that non-lethal
weapons are developed and used with the intent of minimizing the
probability of producing fatalities or significant injuries. The policy
also recognizes that non-lethal weapons are not intended to be risk
free. The label “non-lethal” was chosen by the DoD to emphasize the
intent of these capabilities. There are no guarantees with non-lethal
weapons, rather they represent a dedicated effort to provide U.S.
warfighters additional options when use of lethal force is not
desired. 102
•Non-lethal weapons can be used indiscriminately: Although some
may speculate on whether the principal of discrimination should not
apply to the use of non-lethal weapons, 103 as the previous section in
this article described, U.S. military use of non-lethal weapons must be
in accordance with the law of war. Any non-lethal weapon fielded by
the U.S. military will have completed legal review to ensure the

101. HAROLD EVANS ET AL., THEY MADE AMERICA 465 (2004).
102. See Joseph Siniscalchi, Non-Lethal Technologies: Implications for
Military Strategy 2 (Ctr. for Strat. & Tech., Air War Coll., Occasional
Paper No. 3, 1998) (clarifying that the term non-lethal does not mean
there is no risk of death or permanent injury).
103. See Michael L. Gross, The Second Lebanon War: The Question of
Proportionality and the Prospect of Non-Lethal Warfare, 7 J. MIL.
ETHICS 1, 15-16 (2008) (“Unlike the use of ordinary weapons, non-lethal
weapons deliberately target civilian noncombatants so that the harm
they suffer is no longer incidental but intentional. Targeting civilians in
this way requires that one subject the principle of noncombatant
immunity to a ‘lesser evils’ test that compares a small amount of
intentional harm with a greater level of non-intentional harm that comes
from using high explosives. If the former is significantly less than the
latter, then there are moral grounds to targeting civilian noncombatants
with non-lethal weapons.”)
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associated tactics, techniques, and procedures of its use will adhere to
the principles of discrimination and proportionality. 104
•Slippery slope to war: Some have offered the opinion that the
availability of non-lethal capabilities may increase the likelihood of
war, 105 a hypothesis unsupported by data or real world events. In a
2013 speech to the National Defense University, President Obama
stated a sentiment that has been expressed by many of his
predecessors and other world leaders: “Alongside the decision to put
our men and women in uniform in harm’s way, the decision to use
force against individuals or groups—even against a sworn enemy of
the United States—is the hardest thing I do as President.” 106 Rather,
when use of U.S. military force is necessary, the availability of nonlethal capabilities in the warfighter’s toolkit provides additional
options to support accomplishment of mission objectives while
minimizing the probability of producing fatalities, significant or
permanent injuries, or undesired damage to materiel or critical
infrastructure.
•Eroding warrior ethos and softening of U.S. forces: The idea
that non-lethal weapons will make U.S. forces “soft” or create a
kinder, gentler force is also unsubstantiated. The trademark of the US
military will always be a force trained and equipped with
overwhelming firepower. The biggest users of non-lethal force—special
operators, U.S. Army units, and Marines—have transitioned to lethal
force when needed. Commenting on the Marines experience in
Somalia, Colonel Mike Stanton said non-lethal weapons showed the
United States was willing “to go the extra mile” to avoid killing; were
not at odds with the Marines’ warrior ethos; concerns they would

104. The rule of proportionality requires that before conducting an attack on
a lawful military objective in which civilians will be impacted,
commanders analyze whether the expected incidental injury to civilians,
including death, and/or damage to civilian objects is excessive in
relation to the definite military advantage anticipated by the attack. See
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Additional Protocol I), art. 51(5)(b), 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
The United States is not a party to Additional Protocol I, but
acknowledges this particular provision is consistent with U.S. military
practice. See Practice Related to Rule 97. Human Shields, INT’L COMM.
RED.
CROSS,
https://www.icrc.org/
customary-ihl/eng/
docs/
v2_rul_rule97 (last visited Mar. 27, 2015).
105. COUNCIL ON FOR. REL., NON-LETHAL TECHNOLOGIES, MILITARY OPTIONS
AND IMPLICATIONS 8 (1995).
106. Barak Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the
President at the National Defense University (May 23, 2013) (transcript
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/
remarks-president-national-defense-university).
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make troops “soft” proved unfounded; and that Marines still readily
used lethal force when needed. 107
•Making warfare more lethal: Some have opined that non-lethal
weapons could make warfare more lethal, for example, by using an
incapacitating agent to render the enemy unconscious, and then
engaging them with lethal force. 108 But, this would be a violation of
the Chemical Weapons Convention, 109 and the law of war prohibition
against attacking personnel who have been rendered hors de combat,
that is, persons who have been rendered unconscious or otherwise
incapacitated by wounds, sickness, or shipwreck, such that they are
no longer capable of fighting. 110 Moreover, the reality is that nonlethal weapons are “explicitly designed and primarily employed to
incapacitate targeted personnel or materiel immediately, while
minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired
damage to property in the target area or environment” with
predictable and intended reversible effects, allowing the affected
target to return to pre-engagement functionality. 111 Non-lethal
weapons not only meet tactical and operational needs, but they also
support our national interests, which includes “respect for universal

107. CHRISTOPHER COOK, ETHICS AND WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY 129 (2008).
108. Victor Wallace opined that non-lethal weapons could make warfare
more lethal. See, e.g., THE FUTURE OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS:
TECHNOLOGIES, OPERATIONS, ETHICS AND LAW 142 (Nick Lewer ed.
2002); Pauline Kaurin, With Fear and Trembling: An Ethical
Framework for Non-Lethal Weapons, 9 J. MIL. ETHICS 100, 106 (2010).
109. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction,
Jan. 13, 1993.
110. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea
art. 12 Aug. 12, 1949, (“Members of the armed forces…who are at sea
and who are wounded, sick or shipwrecked, shall be respected and
protected in all circumstances.”); Jean S. Pictet, Commentary, The
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, at 86-87 (“In the first place, it
must be pointed out that the purpose of this provision (art. 12), and
indeed of the whole Convention, is to protect wounded, sick and
shipwrecked persons who, if they were not in this helpless state, could
rightfully be attacked”); FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE
GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD 23 (1898),
(“Whoever intentionally inflicts additional wounds on an enemy already
wholly disabled, or kills such an enemy, or who orders or encourages
soldiers to do so, shall suffer death, if duly convicted, whether he
belongs to the Army of the United States, or is an enemy captured after
having committed his misdeed.”).
111. DoD Directive 3000.03E, supra note 53.
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values at home and around the world,” as stated in the 2014
Quadrennial Defense Review. 112
•Media bias against non-lethal weapons: While non-lethal
weapons have had their share of sensationalist headlines, 113 many
notable print and broadcast media outlets have provided balanced
and unbiased reporting on a wide range of non-lethal capabilities and
the expanded range of options they provide the U.S. military. 114 In
addition, the U.S. Congress continues to be supportive as reflected in
specific references to non-lethal weapons operational utility in
numerous National Defense Authorization Acts. 115

112. U.S. Def. DEP’T., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 2014 11 (2014),
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf
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MO GREEN (Jul. 24, 2010, 10:30 pm),
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Future Missions, NAT. DEF. MAG. (Jul. 2014), http://www.
nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2014/July/Pages/NonlethalWeapo
nsCouldGainGroundinFutureMissions.aspx?PF=1; Tom Zeller, Jr.,
Pentagon Debuts a Non-Lethal Ray Gun, N.Y. TIMES NEWS BLOG (Jan.
26, 2007, 4:57 pm), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/01/26/
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115. See, e.g. H.R. 3304, 113th Congress (2013), available at http://www.
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-113HPRT86280/pdf/CPRT-113HPRT86280.
pdf (providing for non-lethal weapons applied research, development
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VI. Not Easy, Not Always Seen...but Needed
The pursuit of non-lethal capabilities by the U.S. military is a
necessity in a complex world. Non-lethal weapons, by their very
nature, must use new technologies or existing technologies in an
innovative way, in order to provide the desired effects. As Everett M.
Rogers wrote in Diffusion of Innovations, “Many innovations require
a lengthy period of many years from the time when they become
available to the time when they are widely adopted. 116 Historical
examples include opposition to the introduction of electricity in
homes 117, the inclusion of radios in automobiles 118, and the use of
Magnetic Resonance Imaging in medicine 119. Additionally, between
1975 and 1994, the Department of Defense canceled at least nine
unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV, programs. 120 Only after the
Predator UAV was demonstrated in the mid-90s were UAVs widely
used in defense. And, the Global Positioning System, which is
ubiquitous today, survived numerous attempts to terminate it. 121
The reality is that non-lethal weapons already see greater use
than most realize. Blunt trauma munitions are used to ward off
intruders in restricted areas around bases in Afghanistan. 122 For over
ten years, Air Force Security personnel have used Tasers to patrol
and protect bases and sensitive areas. 123 And technological advances,
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KBTX-TV CHANNEL 3 (Mar. 13, 2014), available at http://www.kbtx.
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123. Oriana Pawlyk, Security Forces Using More Electroshock Weapons, AIR
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particularly in directed energy, promise more applications in the
future. 124
For US forces, non-lethal weapons are not an esoteric issue. For
them, they are intended to provide an option to lethal force, in a
world in which military engagements continue to be characterized by
environments where combatants and civilians are closely intermingled.
They also save lives—those of U.S. military personnel, as well as,
those of innocent civilians, caught in the midst of irregular warfare
and disasters. And their use also says something about the United
States, best stated by former Marine Corps Commandant, Gen. James
F. Amos: “… our use of non-lethal weapons coupled with building
partner capacity missions and (military-to-military) exchanges,
strategically communicates our commitment to protect innocence and
reassures our strategic friends and our allies.” 125
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_HTML_format_v1.pdf.
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